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That there is wide discrepancy between the law and first classethical principles is the general assumption of the lay public and the notinfrequent admission of the legal profession. The layman speaks of one'sactions as being "just within the law," and the inference therefromis not il-disguised. It is meant to be anything but complimentary. Itimmediately suggests that the person indicated is unscrupulous andderelict in his duty, as measured by the ethical canon of the speaker.It is, in fact, the frequent aspersion cast upon the law that the moralprinciples of our jurisprudence constitute no worthy pattern of conductfor the decent, self-respecting citizen. In short, the failure of the lawto coincide with what is generally conceded to represent the highestmoral doctrine of the time and place, is assumed to be the shortcomingof the law. High minded men pride themselves upon the breadth ofthe margin between their conduct and that upon which the law fixesits penalty, and he who is content to comply only with the letter of thelaw, incurs their righteous indignation and just censure.
The analytical jurists long ago pointed out the fundamental distinc-tion between law and morals.' Perhaps the greater danger lies in thefailure to recognize the relationship between the two. The laymancondemns the law for failing to coincide with morality while thelawyer is apt to boast of the fact that law is one thing, morals another.Either view seems to ignore the correct relation which the one bearsto the other. It will not be possible here to consider the manner and methodof the incorporation of moral content into legal precepts, depending uponthe particular form of law in which the legal command is embodied.It is possible, however, to investigate the extent to which some legalrules comply with the demands of ethics, together with what seems tobe the reasons therefore. The law of defamation apparently offerssome intelligible illustrations of this process in the development of ourjurisprudence.
At the outset it should be recognized that a considerable discrepancyshould be expected between the law and the doctrines propoundedby the more progressive moral thinkers and teachers. The dogmas ofthe law reflects but tardily the spirit and belief of an age and a people.While the law, in some instances, may be suddenly and radicallychanged by legislative enactment, the broader principles of the commonlaw have evolved for the most part by slow degrees and by gradualprocesses, and moral and ethical generalities have been incorporated intothe law only when they have become thoroughly established by the ex-perience of men as valid and sound and practical.2  It follows thatethics, as a science, must precede the law. New and novel principles
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** Reprinted from DICKINSON LAW REVIEW (December, 1926) by permission.'See Pound, Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 641, 659(1923).
2 For example, the development of tort liability in the action of trespass onthe case for intentional, though indirect violations of property rights. Also thedevelopment of "motive" as determining liability for damage caused by theexercise of legal rights. Cf. Allen vs. Flood (1898), A. C. 1 with Quinn vs.Leathem (1901) A. C. 495. See also Ames, How Far An Act May Be A TortBecause Of The Wrongful Motive Of The Actor, 18 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (1905).Cf. GERMAN CIVIL CODE, sec. 226: The exercise of a right is not permitted,when its sole object is to injure another.
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must prove their worth before they will find a place in the common
law. The law, building as it is on pragmatic considerations, has ever
maintained a consistent conservatism, and it is largely this conservative
tendency that has given it the stability necessary to perform the functions
which society demands of it. In treating the matter of defamation, the
law was early brought face. to face with a moral problem of great
delicacy. The solution which has been worked out slowly and cautiously,
while not infallible, may not compare unfavorably with the axioms of
many who regard their own moral dogmas with scrupulous exactness.
Fundamentally, at least, the rights and duties which the law has pro-
vided to protect one's interest in his reputation have not been in-
consistent in theory with sound moral doctrine, albeit the method
adopted by the law to meet the situation may differ from the method of
ethics.
Certain defamatory words have been flatly prohibited by the
law, being regarded as actionable per se. The specific kinds of remarks
which constitute defamation per se may be largely due to historical
accident, but the theory of such words seems sound enough. To falsely
accuse one of crime has always been regarded as a wrong which thelaw would redress with proof of naught but the defamatory words.3
The legal theory, of course, is that indemnity is provided for the injuryto reputation. This is the gist of the action.4  To accuse one of hav-
ing a foul or contagious disease is actionable on its face, when false, for
the reputation is so injured that ostracism from society is assumed to
follow. Thus the court, in an early case, held that the publication of a
doggerel accusing one of having the "itch" and "stinking of brimstone"
was a libel, for, said the court, "nobody will eat, drink or have any
intercourse with a person who has the itch and stinks of brimstone. " '
So also it is actionable per se, for similar reasons, to employlanguage charging a want of chastity;6 language calculated to injure one
in his business, trade or profession; 7 and words tending to hold one up to
disgrace and ridicule before his friends.8  Thus, it is actionable per se
to call one a thief;9 a murderer; 10 an embezzler;" a perjurer; to say
of one that he is affected of a foul and loathsome disease; 13 to say of
one that he is a fornicator; 4 that a woman is a prostitute;' 5 that a
3 Brooker vs. Coffin, 5 Johns (N. Y.) 188 (1809); POLLOCK ON TORTS,
242 (12th ed.).4 See ODGERS ON LIBEL AND SLANDER, 1 (5th ed.)5 Villers vs. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403; 95 Eng. Rep. 886 (1769).
6 Barnett vs. Ward, 36 Ohio St. 107 (1880). The rule was otherwise at
an earlier stage of the common law. Roberts vs. Roberts, 5 B. & S. 384; 122
Eng. Rep. 874 (1864). See also Douglas vs. Douglas, 4 Idaho 193; 38 Pac. 934
(1895). In all states where the particular acts charged are made punishable bythe criminal law, the words charging the acts are defamatory per se, as imputing
the crime. See NEWELL, SLANDER AND LBEL, 140 (th. ed.)
7Ostrom vs. Calkins, 3 Wend. 163 (1830); Spence vs. Johnson, 142 Ga.
267; 82 S. E. 646 (1914).8 Wandt vs. Hearst's Chicago American, 129 Wis. 419; 110 N. W. 193
(1902).9 Little vs. Barlow, 16 Ga. 423 (1858); Van Hoozer vs. Butler 131 Ark.
404; 199 S. W. 78 (1919).10Widrig vs. Oyer, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 124 (1816).
U Johnson vs. Shields, 25 N. J. L. 116 (1855).
12Cole vs. Grant, 18 N. J. L. 327 (1841).13Monks vs. Monks, 118 Ind. 238; 19 N. E. 418 (1888); McDonald vs.
Nugent, 122 Iowa 651; 98 N. W. 506 (1904).14 Page vs. Merwin, 54 Conn. 426; 8 Atl. 675 (1886).
15McKinney vs. Roberts, 68 Cal. 192; 8 Pac. 857 (1885); Klewin vs. Bau-
man, 53 Wis. 244; 10 N. W. 398 (1881).
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minister was drunk;"' that a merchant uses false weights;- 7 that a white
man is a negro.' s All these have been held actionable as being de-
famatory per se.
The theory in holding such language actionable without proof
of utterance, is that it has actually injured the reputation. The law
seeks only to redress actual wrong, but as the experience of mankind
has warranted some insults are regarded as so outrageous that the law
assumes that they cannot fail to injure the reputation, so the defamedperson will not be required to show how he has been injured, which, insome instances, might conceivably be hard to do.
On the other hand, words with less discourteous import have not
been construed by the law to so shock the sense of decency that
injury will be presumed to necessarily attend their utterance, and in thistype of defamation, the injured party must show how and to what
extent he has actually suffered, for the words are not actionable per se.' 9
This distinction is based upon the theory, sound enough it would seem,
that the law is in no sense a petty weapon which one may employat his pleasure to retaliat for every provocation which he may suffer
in his dealings with others.20  If there be no actual damage to his repu-
tation, he must stay out of court. Consequently to call one a "bluffer"
has been adjudged not actionable per se. 21 It is true that one may not feel
distinctly flattered to be called a "bluffer," but the expression is not so
opprobrious that the law can assume that the reputation is materially
injured thereby. Many men are notorius bluffers and enjoy enviablereputations in their community. Neither has it been adjudged as
slanderous per se to say of one that he is a "bogus peddler; 22 or to
accuse one engaged in an ordinary calling of being drunk; ' or to say
of one that he has had consumption.24  No moral turpitude or degrada-
tion is hereby connoted to an extent justifying an assumption that the
person has suffered an injury to his reputation, so proof of such an
injury is required to warrant a recovery of damages. Just where the
line is to be drawn is, in theory, partly a matter of policy and partly
one of accurate application of legal principles. The latter is in no sense
a moral issue. Of the former we shall have more to say later.
All this is, of course, perfectly well known law. The distinction
between words actionable per se and those requiring proof of special
damages is significant here to indicate the real moral basis of the law
with respect to defamation. Morally, perhaps, men should not say
unkind things about their neighbors. Surely they should not say unkind
things which operate to actually injure the reputation unless they are
prepared to justify them. The law prohibits the latter, i. e. the actualinjury to reputation. The advantages of undue litigation preclude the
law from forbidding remarks of a mere discourteous import. Petty
squabbles and the calling of names not positively vile, should not be
carried to law for the mere sake of vindicating the feelings of the
aggrieved person. The line must be drawn somewhere, so the law has
16 Hayner vs. Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292 (1875).
17Pfeily vs. Henry 269 Pa. 533; 112 At. 768 (1921).18Flood vs. News and Courier Co., 71 S. C. 112; 50, S. E. 637 (1905).19Dailey vs. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 136 N. Y. S. 570; S. C. S. T. (1912).2 0 Walker vs. Tribune Co. 29 Fed. 827 (1887).
21 Eislie vs. Walther, 4 N. Y. S. 385 (1889).
2 2 Pike vs. Van Wormer, 5 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 171 (1850).23Torres vs. Huner, 150 App. Div. 798; 135 N. Y. S. 332 (1912).24Rade vs. Press Pub. Co., 37 Misc. 245; 75 N. Y. S. 298 (1902).
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flatly prohibited certain language, the effect of which may reasonably
be expected to produce injury, by making them actionable on proof of
utterance alone. Any other language must be shown to result in actual
injury before the law will undertake to redress. In all cases, the effect
of liability for defamation is to lend particular emphasis to that excellent
admonition of scriptural morality-judge not lest ye be judged. In any
event, it places upon one the onus of adjudging correctly, which is not
an altogether bad moral principle.
Of more ethical significance is the attitude of the law toward the
immemorial practice of gossip-monging. To report what someone else
has said, for what it is worth, is often justified by the most circumspect
gossipers, as a perfectly ethical pastime. More critical moralists, how-
ever, condemn it, as does the law. The law does not free from culpa-
bility him who but reports the defamatory language of another. 25 It
has been invariably held that each repetition of a slanderous or libellous
statement amounts to a fresh publication. 26  By repeating it, one
thereby makes the defamatory matter his own. Perfectly logical, of
course, is this rule, for it must be remembered that in every case the
law is redressing an injury to reputation. Surely the broadcasting by
continued repetition of injurious language affects the reputation quite as
much, if not more than the original publication. The rule is well fixed
in this regard, so that ingenuity in the manufacture of defamatory
rumor is no more culpable than preseverance in repeating it. The rule
is undoubtedly in accord with the highest ethical principles and its
development has been influenced by purely moral considerations.
Of more significance, perhaps, than this clipping of the wings of
gentle Fama, is the matter of truth as a defense in actions for defama-
tion. Here a tremendous moral problem is presented, and the solution
which has been worked out would seem to reflect singular credit to the
law. Formerly the truth of the statements charged was regarded as a
complete defense.2 7  As observed by a court in one of the older cases
in this country, "no general principles of right to damages can be
founded in a publication of the truth, from the consideration that the
reason for awarding damages fails. The right to compensation . . . is
founded upon deception and fraud to the detriment of the plaintiff. If
the imputation is true, there is no deception or fraud and no right to
compensation." 28 This may ignore the essential nature of the action,
but the rule of law stated is in strict conformity with common law
doctrine. Perhaps the sounder basis was expressed by another court,
opining that "unless the charge made by the defendant against the
plaintiff was false as well as malicious, the plaintiff has no right to
recover damages from him. The falsehood of the charge is a necessary
element in the plaintiff's case. He cannot complain of anyone for
speaking of him nothing but the truth.129
This reasoning was cogent enough for the common law for a long
time. It is not without merit. Inasmuch as damages are allowed for
defamation by reason of injury to reputation, it may well be asked by
what moral law one may insist upon the integrity of a better reputation
25Morse vs. Printing Co., 124 Iowa 707; 100 N. W. 867 (1904); Hainesvs. Campbell, 74 Md. 158; 21 Ad. 702 (1891); Darling vs. Mansfield, 222
Mich. 278; 192 N. W. 595 (1923).26Brewer vs. Chase, 121 Mich. 526; 80 N. W. 575 (1899).2 7 0DGERS ON SLANDER AND LIBEL, 181 (4th ed.).28Castle vs. Houston, 19 Kan. 417 (1877).29Ellis vs. Buzzell, 60 Me. 209 (1872).
DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
than his character warrants. If it is not better than his character,
statements of the truth can in no wise injure his reputation, and the
truth should constitute a complete defense to an action for slander
or libel.
When Puritanic ideals of ethics and morality began to give way
in their harshness to more humanitarian doctrines, it became apparent
that the truth was not necessarily a moral justification. It was a vicious
principle, after all, which endorsed the telling of a nasty tale on the
sole grounds that it was a true one. Men began to realize, too, that
there was a double aspect to the situation. It was frequently unfair and,
in some instances a great hardship upon the person defamed, and at the
same time subversive of the public morals to permit such promiscuous
and extravagant slanders. In many situations it was neither advan-
tageous to the defamer nor to the public at large. On the other hand,
there were some circumstances under which the public not only could
justly demand knowledge of the deficiencies in character of individuals,
but it became one's obvious duty to furnish such information of this
kind as came within his ken.
The law, then, had two conflicting interests to weigh. There was
the interest of society in restricting foul and unnecessary evil talk and
there was the interest of society in acquiring information of the infirmities
of any of its members insofar as those shortcomings were likely to af-
fect the public. The first interest was augmented by what appeared to
be kindness and forbearance with respect to the individuals directly con-
cerned, whereas the latter social interest was emphasized by the peril
of those members of society who might deal with the persons in
question to their sorrow. Some principle was demanded for this com-
plex problem of moral issues which would adequately protect every
interest involved. By degrees, the doctrine took shape and form, since
expressed in statutes in a number of our states, that the truth, in
actions for defamation, should constitute a complete defense only when
accompanied by proof of good motives and evidence that the statements
were made for justifiable ends, unless such statements were made under
what has been called an absolute privilege. It is thus that a complete
absence of malice, a typically moral situation, is necessary to vindicate
defamatory remarks, although they be, in fact, true. As stated by
the chief justice of the supreme court of Oregon, "every injurious publi-
cation of and concerning another, if it contain libellous matter, is pre-
sumed to have been made maliciously and this presumption continues
until it appears that the matter charged as libellous is in fact true, and
was published with good motives and justifiable ends."30
Here is complete accord between legal doctrine and first hand
moral principles. It must be clear that in the main there is a great
difference between the methods of ethics and jurisprudence. Ethics is
eternally subjective, whereas the law is predominantly objective. 31 Ethics
looks to the inner life of man; it seeks to perfect the motives of con-
duct; it strives to make man pure in heart. The law, on the other
hand, has always been an institution primarily concerned with actual,
manifest conduct. The purpose of the two sciences are different al-
though the material dealt with, in many cases, is the same.3 2
30State vs. Mason, 26 Oregon, 273, 277; 38 Pac. 130 (1894).31See on the externality of the law, HOLMES, COMMON LAW, 110 ff. (1909).3 2As to "identity of material and diversity of purpose," see STAMMLER,
THEORY OF JUSTICE, 44 (1925).
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Sometimes the law becomes apparently subjective, but usually the
subjectivity is more apparent than real. Thus the criminal law seeks to
ascertain the intent, but not the motive, in the commission of an act
charged as criminal. Frequently, however, intent is but a fiction. The
law often presumes intent from actual conduct; it insists that one com-
mitting certain acts under certain circumstances shall be deemed to have
done so with a criminal intent, so that, after all, an objective standard
constitutes the test for both conduct and intent, and the legal theory of
things obscures the reality." In treating the present problem of defama-
tion, the law apparently compromises in method. It adopts the ethical
viewpoint and looks to the motives of the defamer. The concession
again is only partial, for certain presumptions must make it difficult for
the slanderer to justify motives in situations where the subjective basis
therefore is too highly intangible. The law must not wander too far
from the path of objectivity, for it is by faithful preseverance here
that the bulwarks against ignorance and stupidity are created and
maintained. No man shall be permitted to deny the intent to produce
the natural consequences of his own acts although it makes guilty him
who may be, in truth and in fact, morally guiltless. The law is de-
signed to protect society not only from the lusts of evil minds but as
well from the stupidity of stunted intellects. For these reasons the
ordinary prudent man or the hypothetically reasonable person is a
spectre that haunts the "good" but thoughtless.
The exigencies of modern society which raise a moral duty for one
to speak are so many that the law has concocted the ingenious device
of privilege to rebut the presumption of malice which is raised by the
utterance of words actionable per se. Privilege rests upon the moral
grounds that some circumstances arise which justify the use of what
would otherwise be defamatory language, regardless of the injury to
individuals, by reason of the importance of the information thus con-
veyed to the public or to other individuals. One might be obligated by
the highest ethical considerations to make statements which but indicate
a suspicion on his part of another's depravity, the suspicions themselves
eventually proving to be ill founded. One may speak on such oc-
casions with impunity. It is thus that a legislator is absolved from
blame and liability for remarks made upon the floor of the legislative
chamber, be they ever so slanderous, providing, of course, that they are
made in the course of legislative business and official proceedings. 3 4 And
the privilege is a defense even though the statements be false.85 The
law regards the complete freedom from civil liability under these circum-
stances as more important than compelling the speaker to adhere
strictly to what he knows to be true. There are political remedies
for abuses of the privilege or lack of discretion in invoking it
It is by reason of privilege also that one may feel free to criticize
the government and those occupying positions of public trust and con-
fidence. Particularly is this consistent with the political theory of
representative government as well as such ethical principles as may
support our doctrines of political science. As observed in the case of
Chicago vs. Chicago Tribune,6 "when the people became sovereign as
they did when our government was established under our Constitution,
and the ministers became servants of the people, the right to discuss
33See SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 83 (7th ed.).34Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808).35 ODGERS, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 231, 232.36 307 Ill. 595; 139 N. E. 86 (1923).
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government followed as a natural consequence." 37  It is also privilege
that subjects to what frequently amounts to the most galling criticism
all purveyors of literary and artistic creations.38 One who submits his
efforts in art, philosophy, literature, music and the like, to the public
for appraisal must not complain if that unfeeling and caustic abstraction
receives them in a manner by no means reassuring to the author or
composer. When, however, expressions of opinion and what purports
to be criticism becomes wholly unfair and amounts to a personal attack
upon the artist's character, the privilege is lost and the injured party
may have his action.39 An attorney, for language employed necessarily
in the trial of a cause, may likewise invoke the protection of privilege,*°
as may witnesses for answers fairly made to questions while on the
witness stand.41 The theory, in each case, is the community of interests
of the speaker and the auditor. In speaking with reference to an
alleged slanderous charge of theft, a southern judge stated the grounds
in the following terms:42
"Words falsely spoken to another, imputing a criminal offense are
actionable per se, and the law presumes malice in their utterance,
therefore it is not necessary in such case for the plaintiff in an action
for slander to prove express malice, unless the words spoken constitute
a privileged communication.
"A communication, although it contains criminatory matter, is
privileged when made in good faith upon any subject in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a
right or duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest,
right or duty and made upon an occasion to properly serve such right,
interest or duty, and in a manner and under circumstances fairly
warranted by the occasion and the right, duty or interest, and not so
made as to unnecessarily or unduly injure another, or to show express
malice."
It will be seen that privilege has well defined limits beyond which
one passes at his peril. The conception of privilege is nothing more than
a theoretical device which legal doctrine has originated to refute the
legal inference of malice, that is, the defamatory statements are not
made with good motives. The law has rightly placed the burden of
prooving good motives upon him who defames, but privilege removes
the burden by suggesting that the particular curcumstances of the
utterance were such as to justify the language used. It is seen, then,
that the essential element in defamation is malice, and malice is a
matter of moral right and wrong. Originally the fact that the de-
famatory language was true was sufficient to repel the inference that
words slanderous per se were uttered maliciously. Perhaps the effect
of the law under this rule was to make legal malice impossible, regardless
of actual malice. The law later developed to the point where it was
not only necessary to show the truth of the statements, but an absence
of malice must be shown as well, or, in other words, good motives and
justifiable ends. The privilege, however, accomplishes the object of
negative malice, and this even when the words used are false. "The
37139 N. E. 86, 88.3SSee NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 547.s9Fraser vs. Berkley, 7 C. & P. 621; M. & R. 3 (1836).40McDavitt vs. Boyer, 169 IM. 475; 48 N. E. 317 (1897).42Abraham vs. Baldwin, 52 Fla. 154; 42 So. 591 (1906).
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term privilege," it has been said,43 "as applied to a communication
alleged to be libellous, means simply that the circumstances under which
it was made are such as to repel the legal inference of malice, and to
throw upon the plaintiff the burden of offering some evidence of its
existence beyond the falsity of the charge."
Thus, although privilege is a defense, even though the words used
be false, the magical effect of the protection may be lost. The re-
futation of malice is only prima facie. If the refutation can be over-
come and malice actually shown to exist, the words, if false, become
actionable, the privilege disappears and the defamer is liable.44  This
holds true for practically every privilege except that of the legislator and
the judge when performing official duties.4 5  In these two exceptions,
the privilege is said to be "absolute," and the refutation of malice raised
by the circumstances is impregnable. In other words, the presumption
in these cases that no malice exists is a conclusive presumption, regardless
of whether malice exists in fact or not. As has been suggested, the
importance of immunity from civil proceedings and the existence of
other remedies influence the law to devise the absolute privilege here,
but in substantially all other cases of privilege there is but a qualified
protection which is lost the moment actual malice is proved.
Thus it is that the machinery of the law of defamation functions.
In the first place defamation is, in substance, injury to reputation.
Certain kinds of language have come by such an accepted slanderous
meaning that their very utterance constitutes defamation, regardless of
actual injury-the law conclusively presumes injury. The law also
presumes malice in the case of words defamatory per se. If defamatory
words are to be justified by their truth, an absence of malice must be
shown and the presence of justifiable ends. Every ingredient of
defamation is then lacking; there is no false charge, maliciously made.
If words are false, or if they are defamatory on their face, the law
presumes malice unless the existence of a privilege refutes this pre-
sumption, but if the privilege is negatived by proof of actual malice,
the protection is lost and the elements of actionable defamation are
present.
From the part which falsity and malice play in determining liability,
it is readily seen that the fundamental considerations involved are of an
essentially ethical nature. No moral code places its stamp of approbation
upon false witness or upon malicious or wanton wrong. To this extent,
then, the law is enforcing, not moral precepts, but legal precepts which
have been developed by the weight of ethical considerations. The law
has come into accord with morals to this extent.
The complicated machinery of the law, involving privilege, burden
of proof, presumptions, actual malice, legal malice and the like, are
simply devices, awkward perhaps, but nevertheless effective, to aid
in the practical application of legal doctrine to the affairs of men.
Sometimes the effect of these technical agencies seems to disregard the
realities of life and to ignore truth and fact. Yet this very objectivity
of the law, this externality, is necessitated by a bigger reality than the
43Rotholz vs. Dunkle, 53 N. J. L. 438; 22 Ati. 193 (1891).44See Cardoza, J., in Andrews vs. Gardner, 224 N. Y. 440, 447; 121 N. E.341 (1918).45See Liddon, J., in Coogler vs. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240, 248; 21 So. 109
(1897). See also Sloss, J., in Gosewisch vs. Doran, 161 Cal. 511, 514; 119
Pac. 656 (1911).
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particular instance of application. If the truth and facts of the specific
instance seem to be ignored by the force of legal presumptions, it
must be because the law has its eye upon the truths and facts of life
as a whole, and in the long run, the experience of many men is regarded
as the only safe grounds upon which to fashion rules for the guidance
of the conduct of society. It is no indictment of the law that it
fails to accord with ethics in the specific instance. Law pertains to
conduct; ethics to thinking. It is enough if the fundamental grounds
for distinction and the basis for fixing liability are not inconsistent with
ethical postulates. "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he" to the
moralist, but the law must confine its chief scrutiny to conduct. When
precepts are laid down to govern conduct, it is not the heart subjective
that must be considered, but the heart objective, the heart of the
average man, as indicated by his conduct. In law, thoughts are
evidenced by actions. If men live together peaceably, jurisprudence
must be content to let them live nobly, and perchance go to heaven,
in some other way.
Insofar as ethical considerations have influenced the law to bring
about a conformity between law and morals, rules of law are in accord
with ethical principles. The purpose of law, however, is different, as is
the method adopted to attain that purpose. We have seen that so far
as the law of defamation is concerned, the rules of law are fundamentally
based upon ethics. The operation of these rules, however, are peculiarly
legal, and it is here that law and morals diverge. It might be helpful,
however, to recognize the limitations of each science, and, by noting
carefully the extent to which the one overlaps the other as yell as the
point of departure, to thereby ascertain some notion of the true rela-
tionship between the common law and Christian morality.

